

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Nov 21 9 50 PM '62

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ACTION: 'USUN, NEW YORK

PRIORITY 1339

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FOR STEVENSON AND McCLOY

Authority

SUBJECT: Next Steps in New York Negotiations

NARS, Date

Following is draft U.S. declaration in Security Council

Pass
Electri-
cally
to
EXCOM

referred to in previous telegram:

In letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy on October 28, 1962, ~~firm~~ ^{firm} undertakings were made regarding the settlement of the Cuban crisis.

DONE BY
ACCEPT-
ANCE

These undertakings were stated in President Kennedy's letter of October 27, and quoted in the Acting Secretary General's letter of October 28, along the following lines:

(1) The USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use and would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

(2) The United States would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. The President also

Drafted by:

IO:HCleveland/JJSisco:mtb

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Harlan Cleveland

Cleared by:

U:GVBell

11/21/62

~~WattaxHsxXXXXXXBundy~~

@S/S-Mr. Breisky

The Under Secretary

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expressed his confidence that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

The United States notes the statement made by the Soviet Union that all medium and intermediate range missiles, all nuclear weapons and components have been removed from Cuba, that all IL-28 bomber aircraft will be removed by December 20th, and that all sites for medium range and intermediate range missiles have been dismantled. It notes also that the USSR has stated its intention to withdraw all military units and personnel placed there for the servicing or guarding of these weapons systems. The United States notes further the statements of the USSR that no weapons capable of offensive use will be introduced into Cuba in the future. We welcome these statements and assurances.

The undertakings in the President's letter of October 27, that the United Nations would be enabled to verify the removal of missiles and bombers and the destruction of sites, and that United Nations safeguards would be agreed upon to ensure against ~~any~~ further ~~introduction~~ introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use, have not ~~been~~ been fulfilled. A minimum inspection procedure was, however, arranged in cooperation with the USSR, under which United States naval vessels have verified that Soviet vessels leaving Cuba have carried out a number of missiles which the USSR had certified to the United States as having been in Cuba. The Soviet Union has also agreed to similar verification of the imminent ~~withdrawal~~ withdrawal of all IL-28 bomber aircraft.

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verification

In the absence of Cuban agreement to United Nations and safeguards, the nations of the Organization of American States have no choice but to continue to be alert through their own resources to any possibility that offensive weapons systems ~~remain~~ remain or are reintroduced into Cuba.

In consideration of the steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union to date, the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962, has been lifted on November 20, 1962.

Provided no nuclear weapons or ~~weapons systems~~ capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and the United States is in position to be satisfied on these ~~point~~ ~~points~~ points, and provided Cuba does not invade or support an invasion of any other country, the United States declares that it will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba. This declaration is made on the representation of the Soviet Union here in the Security Council and does not alter any of the rights or ~~be~~ obligations set forth in the UN Charter and the Rio Pact.

END

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29

Draft Message to USUN for Stevenson and McCloy

NEXT STEPS IN NEW YORK NEGOTIATIONS

I

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

1. The loose ends still remaining unfulfilled in original understanding between President and Khrushchev are these:
On Soviet side, on-site UN-supervised verification of removal of offensive weapons, and longer-term safeguards against their reintroduction. On our side, formal assurances against invasion of Cuba.

2. Recent indications from Soviets make clear their intention: to disengage militarily from Cuba, but to stick to their story that they have saved the Castro regime from US invasion. Our interest lies in speeding the disengagement process, while avoiding the kind of commitment that unduly ties our hands in dealing with the Castro regime while it lasts.

3. On verification and safeguards,

(a) The Soviets have given no indication that they are prepared to press Castro regime as hard as would be necessary to get Cubans to agree to any acceptable inspection system;

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, A/CDC/MR

(b) Cubans

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- 2 -

(b) Cubans have consistently been adamant in objecting to ground inspection of any kind, and have rejected several progressively softer proposals by SYG on verification;

(c) Both Soviets and Cubans have stressed need for reciprocal arrangements involving inspection of other Caribbean areas, probably including US, as price for inspection of Cuba.

4. Therefore it is not going to be possible in the short run to get a UN system of short term verification or long term safeguards on offensive weapons in the Caribbean.

5. Assuming (which is not wholly clear) that it would be possible to develop a satisfactory arrangement for adequate long-term safeguards on basis of mutuality in the Caribbean area, it is not (repeat not) to our interest to have the Soviets involved in creating, sponsoring, or administering such safeguards.

6. Absence of inspection arrangements, while leaving part of original deal unfulfilled, does provide rationale for (a) continued US photographic reconnaissance over Cuba, operating under existing OAS resolution, and (b) the tough conditions on our non-invasion assurances.

TOP SECRET

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II.

Long Stall vs. Rapid Wrap-Up

1. On this analysis, that we will not be able to get satisfactory arrangements on verification and safeguards, we face two alternatives:

(a) to continue negotiations for an indefinite period, insisting on Soviet compliance with our full position that there should be UN verification of their withdrawal of offensive weapons as well as "suitable safeguards" against their reintroduction into Cuba;

(b) to close out this phase of the negotiations immediately on the basis of the steps the Soviet Union has taken and will promise to take, adapting our undertakings to reflect the absence so far of meaningful UN inspection arrangements.

2. There are distinct advantages to closing out this phase of the negotiations with the Soviets without delay. The Soviets would have the opportunity to disengage themselves from major military involvement in Cuba. We would be enabled to deal with Cuba largely as a Hemispheric problem and to consider next steps on long range safeguards in a Caribbean Latin American context, without the intrusion of the Soviet Union. This would permit us to seek progress with the Soviet Union on wider subjects, such as nuclear testing, Berlin, disarmament and the election of the Secretary General.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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III

TOWARD A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

1. To accomplish a speedy wrap-up of current phase of negotiations, Soviets evidently have in mind a Security Council meeting at which agreed declarations would be made by the US and the USSR, a report would be made by SYG, and an agreed summation would be made by Chairman or in simple procedural resolution adopted by the Council. Soviets are not insisting on a formal protocol, nor do they seem to be insisting that Cubans be parties to this accord at this stage.

2. The United States is quite prepared to work toward such a wrap-up meeting of Security Council. In view of the non-fulfillment of important aspects of the original understanding, we cannot and should not declare the understanding fulfilled. However, we can adopt a procedure which enables a "line to be drawn under" the US-Soviet crisis over Cuba, while leaving open questions that must be sorted out with Cuba in hemispheric context over longer span of time.

3. In the course of negotiations during this next phase, we would have to make clear, both to Soviets and to general public, that Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding was never properly fulfilled, and the absence of on-site verification and of longer-term safeguards against reintroduction makes it necessary for OAS to retain full freedom of action as regards aerial surveillance and other

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means of keeping a close eye on Cuban behavior and any evidence of renewed Soviet intrusion into Hemisphere. We would continue to remind world that declaration of intention must be independently checked in a world still so full of international mistrust, which has just been treated to a classic example of large-scale duplicity. However, until after SC meeting we would avoid making our intentions on continued air surveillance manifest in a form or forum that would require Soviets to raise issue of violation of Cuban air space.

4. In the circumstances we will have to place conditions on our non-invasion assurance which are justified by absence of Cuban cooperation with the United Nations and the inability (or unwillingness) of the Soviets to induce the Cubans to cooperate. This will leave the door open for regional arrangements for longer-term safeguards if Cubans cooperate, and for continued OAS air surveillance of Cuba, and military response to any Cuban aggression, if they do not.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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SCENARIO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Within this framework we would favor a Security Council meeting during next week at which the following steps would be taken:

1. The Secretary-General would report on the steps he has taken, and in particular his series of unsuccessful efforts to secure Cuban agreement to UN on-site inspection to verify withdrawal and dismantling of offensive weapons and to safeguard against future reintroduction.

2. The Soviet Union would make a declaration indicating steps it has taken pursuant to the US-USSR understanding and containing assurances that all missiles and nuclear components have been removed, that the IL-28's would come out within four weeks, that military units and personnel intended for the protection of these weapons systems will be removed in time, and that no offensive weapons would be reintroduced in Cuba in the future.

3. The United States would make a parallel declaration:

- (a) taking note of the Soviet assurances cited above;
- (b) indicating that we have lifted the quarantine;
- (c) stating our non-invasion assurances, contingent on Cuban behavior.

4. These declarations would be noted by the Security Council President in a "summation" which would have to be

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-7-

agreed ahead of time. Alternatively a brief procedural resolution noting the declaration might be less difficult to achieve than getting UAR to agree to an acceptable summation. If a resolution is used, it should contain no substantive elements and should establish no continuing machinery.

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DRAFT UNITED STATES DECLARATION IN SECURITY COUNCIL

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These undertakings were stated in President Kennedy's letter of October 27 along the following lines:

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- (2) The United States would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. The President also expressed his confidence that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

The United States notes the statement made by the Soviet Union that all medium and intermediate range missiles, all nuclear weapons and components have been removed from Cuba, that all IL-28 bomber aircraft will be removed within four weeks, and that all sites for medium range and intermediate range missiles have been dismantled. It notes also that the

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-9-

USSR has stated its intention to withdraw all military units and personnel placed there for the servicing^{or} guarding of these weapons systems. The United States notes further the statements of the USSR that no weapons capable of offensive use will be introduced into Cuba in the future. We welcome these statements and assurances.

The understandings that the United Nations would verify the removal of missiles and bombers and the destruction of sites, and that United Nations safeguards would be established to ensure against further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use, have not been fulfilled. A minimum inspection procedure was, however, arranged in cooperation with the USSR, under which the United States naval vessels have verified that Soviet vessels leaving Cuba have carried out a number of missiles which the USSR had certified to the United States as having been in Cuba. The Soviet Union has also agreed to similar verification of the imminent withdrawal of all IL-28 bomber aircraft.

In the absence of Cuban agreement to United Nations verification and safeguards, the nations of the Organization of American States have no choice but to continue to be alert through their own resources to any possibility that offensive weapons systems remain or are reintroduced into Cuba.

In consideration of the steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union to date, the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962, has been lifted on November 20, 1962.

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